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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MS, MEZENEN'S 
CLAIM FOR UNDISTRIBUTED PRE-DECREE PROFITS OF 
THE BUSINESS: THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS 
FOR SUCH AN AWARD. 
Ms, Mezenen has attacked the trial court's determination 
regarding pre-decree profits of Kelly's Excavating, LLC despite the 
court's uncontroverted determination that Ms. Mezenen had no 
involvement with the business subsequent to the parties' 
separation. In fact, Mr. Mezenen continued management of the 
business during the separation pursuant to court order. In light 
of these undisputed findings, Ms. Mezenen's arguments regarding the 
trial court's findings of pre-decree profits are unavailing. 
The trial court denied Ms. Mezenen's claim for undistributed 
net profits from Kelly's Excavating, LLC. (Decree of Divorce, f 
7) . That determination was based upon the court's finding that 
"since the parties' separation in the fall of 1994, Plaintiff has 
had virtually no contact with Kelly's Excavating, LLC and that her 
duties and responsibilities were assumed and discharged during that 
period by the Defendant based upon Court order . . . ." (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 9). 
Ms. Mezenen attempts to controvert this express finding by 
claiming that she "offered" to continue her employment at Kelly's 
1 
Excavating, LLC. That assertion is insufficient to sustain her 
argument, particularly in light of the court's previous order that 
Mr. Mezenen continue management of the business, which was not only 
logical but premised on the fact that Ms. Mezenen had never been 
heavily involved in management of the business1. 
However, and more importantly, the court found that there was 
no cash available to effectuate the distribution of ±he 
undistributed profits of the business. Specifically, ±he xsourt 
found that all undistributed profits of the business accumulated 
between the date of the parties' separation in September 1994 to 
the date of the Decree were either (1) accounted for in draws 
received by Mr. Mezenen as salary; (2) paid to Ms. Mezenen as 
temporary alimony; or (3) any available cash was included in the 
calculation of the net worth of the business. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, f 23). 
Ms. Mezenen has advanced no concrete facts in support of her 
argument that such "phantom" profits should have been distributed. 
Rather, she asserts merely that defendant's imputed salaries in the 
amount of $72,000.00 for 1994 and $75,000.00 for 1995 were 
1
 In fact, the court found that the $2,000.00 per month 
salary received by Ms. Mezenen before the parties' separation was 
a mere of income shift frcm Mr. Mezenen in order for Ms. Mezenen to 
claim her children as exemptions and deductions for income tax 
purposes. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, J 13). 
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excessive, and that there was a sufficient sum in accounts 
receivable and cash to support a claim for undistributed profits. 
As more fully discussed below, the imputed salary amounts were 
fully supported by the record. Furthermore, as explained in the 
court's findings, such available cash was included in the business 
net worth calculations. Since Ms. Mezenen was awarded one-half the 
value of the business, she received her portion of those funds, 
simply in a different form. Consequently, there is no basis or 
funds for any pre-decree distribution of profits, and the trial 
court's finding in this regard should be upheld. 
II. 
TBI TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED MR. 
MEZENEN'S IMPUTED SALARY BASED UPON THE EXTENT 
AND NATURE OF HIS WORK: FURTHERMORE. THE 
COURT'S VALUATION OF THE BUSINESS IS FULLY 
SUPPORTED. 
Despite the fact that she received one-half of the value of 
the business, Ms. Mezenen challenges the trial court's marital 
estate division based upon its valuation of the business and the 
salary imputed to Mr. Mezenen. 
Ms. Mezenen cites extensive, although misapplied, authority in 
support of the proposition that a business considered to be a 
martial asset is subject to equitable distribution principles. Her 
reliance upon such authority is clearly misplaced; Ms. Mezenen in 
fact received one-half the value of the business, as determined by 
3 
the court2. (Decree of Divorce, f 14). In fact, as Ms. Mezenen 
herself acknowledges, the heart of her dispute regarding 
distribution of the business involves its valuation; specifically, 
the difference in valuation of the business based upon Mr. 
Mezenen's imputed salary. (See Appellee's Brief, at p. 32). 
Ms. Mezenen sets forth absolutely no specific facts which 
could conceivably support h8*r^  attack on the imputed salary of 
$72,000.00 and $75,000.00 for 1994 and 1995, respectively, and did 
not do so at trial. In light of the court's detailed findings, her 
claim is insufficient. The court specifically found that Mr. 
Mezenen was responsible for virtually all aspects of the business; 
negotiating contracts, financing arrangements, securing customers 
as well as performing the construction work. In fact, the court 
found that "the business is dependent upon the Defendant and his 
construction skills and expertise for its successful operations." 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 21). The court also 
found that Mr. Mezenen4 worked 12 to 14 hours per day, often seven 
days a week. 
The court's Finding is undoubtedly based on the testimony of 
Mr. Mezenen's accounting expert, Merrill Norman. Mr. Norman 
2
 The cash payment ordered by the court to equalize the 
property division is exactly the type which was affirmed in the 
case cited by Ms. Mezenen, Weston v. Westonr 773 P.2d 408 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
4 
testified that his estimation of a reasonable, market based salary 
for Mr. Mezenen was based upon (1) his interviews with Mr. Mezenen; 
(2) a job offer that Mr. Mezenen had in November, 1995; and (3) 
other reported salaries for heavy equipment operators as set forth 
in the Utah Heavy and Highwaymaster Agreement (R. at 683-683; 688-
691). Furthermore, Ms. Mezenen's unsubstantiated attempt to attack 
the number of hours of work that the court attributed to Mr. 
Mezenen is equally unavailing. Mr. Norman testified that his 
salary figure was based upon a ten to twelve hour work day, 6 % 
days per week, which he then reduced by 15% as an element of 
conservatism. (R. at 719). Significantly, Mr. Mezenen was not 
merely an employee of the business; he performed a great deal of 
the equipment operation, as well as managing all affairs and 
aspects of the business. 
Ms. Mezenen has utterly failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the court's Finding, as she is required to do, and then 
set forth facts sufficient to controvert these Findings. In truth, 
she does not even attempt to controvert them and on the merits and 
the evidence can not do so. Instead, she relies solely upon 
generalized allegations of fraud. Ms. Mezenen cites the testimony 
of Donna Chatwin, who claimed that Mr. Mezenen was in fact 
concealing assets from the court. However, Ms. Mezenen fails to 
show how such alleged concealment of assets impacts the valuation 
5 
of the business and the salary imputed to Ms. Mezenen. She appears 
to be arguing that Mr. Mezenen should somehow be punished by 
increasing the value of the business, and, consequently, the amount 
of the distribution to her. Because Ms. Mezenen has failed to 
point to any evidence in the record sufficient to controvert the 
court's findings regarding valuation, the distribution as ordered 
by the court should be upheld and sustained^ 
III. 
THE CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT AND FUNDS USED TO 
MAKE A DOWN PAYMENT ON THE PARTIES' RESIDENCE 
WERE PRE-MARITAL ASSETS WHICH THE COURT 
PROPERLY CREDITED TO MR, MEZENEN. 
Ms. Mezenen objects to the court's award of certain assets to 
Mr. Mezenen; specifically, a Certificate of Deposit in the 
approximate amount of $13,000.00, and a $5,800.00 cash down payment 
on the parties' residence. These assets were properly determined 
to be the pre-marital property of Mr. Mezenen and, consequently, 
not subject to equitable distribution. Ms. Mezenen has asserted 
absolutely no facts whatsoever sufficient to overcome this well-
established rule. 
The court specifically found that the Certificate of Deposit 
and down payment on the parties' residence were the pre-marital 
assets of Mr. Mezenen. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
f's 7, 8). This finding is more than adequately supported by the 
6 
evidence in the record. Specifically, (1) the house on which Mr. 
Mezenen made the down payment was purchased before the marriage; 
(2) Ms. Mezenen was unemployed and receiving public assistance and 
housing benefits when the parties began their relationship 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f s 3, 4); and (3) the 
Certificate of Deposit was an inheritance received by Mr. Mezenen 
prior to the parties marriage (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, f 7). 
Consequently, Mr. Mezenen was properly awarded these assets. 
As this Court, along with the Utah Supreme Court, has repeatedly 
held, "premarital property is considered separate property and will 
be retained by the party who brought it into the marriage." 
Rappleye v. Rapplaye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Ms. 
Mezenen has failed to demonstrate any evidence in the record which 
would tend to overcome this presumption. Consequently, the trial 
court's ruling should be upheld. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EQUITABLE ALLOCATION OF 
BUSINESS ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, INCLUDING 
THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MARITAL BUSINESS, 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
In her Brief, Ms. Mezenen has advanced a frankly 
unintelligible argument regarding allocation of tax liabilities. 
This appears to be the same argument which was raised by Ms. 
7 
Mezenen's counsel at trial and rejected in its entirety by the 
trial court. Ms. Mezenen is apparently attempting to argue that 
Mr. Mezenen7s imputed income of $72,000.00 for 1994 and $75f000.00 
for 1995, combined with the court's equitable allocation of the 
business7 assets and liabilities, including those associated with 
taxes, has resulted in some prejudice to her, In fact, the 
approach espoused by Ms. Mezenen is not only unsupported, it is 
essentially a request that the court enter an order beyond its 
jurisdiction. 
Ms. Mezenen7s argument is apparently based on a misunder-
standing of the effect of the imputation of a salary to Mr. Mezenen 
for purposes of valuing the business. The imputation of a salary 
to Mr. Mezenen most certainly did not represent funds being 
received by Mr. Mezenen, nor did the business ever have the cash 
available to make these distributions. 
In fact, as recognized by the trial court, Mr. Mezenen was 
receiving a $2,000.00 per month salary prior to the parties7 
separation, which was transferred to Ms. Mezenen in early 1994 to 
allow her to sufficient earnings to claim her two children from a 
previous marriage as tax deductions. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, f 13). During this period, Mr. Mezenen 
received absolutely no compensation for his full-time management of 
8 
the company. This arrangement continued despite the fact that Mr. 
Mezenen worked exceptionally long hours, often seven days a week, 
in his active management of every aspect of the business' 
operations. Ms. Mezenen, on the other hand, had only limited 
involvement with the company even prior to the separation. 
Furthermore, by adopting the business valuation of Mr. 
Mezenen's expert, Merrill Norman, the trial court rendered an 
equitable allocation of all of the business assets and liabilities, 
including tax benefits and detriments. In essence, Ms. Mezenen is 
asking the court to issue orders regarding the substance of federal 
income tax returns, something which it has no jurisdiction to do. 
For Ms. Mezenen to argue that Mr. Mezenen should bear the burden of 
a tax liability based upon an income which he never received, when 
the court executed an equitable allocation of all aspects of the 
business, is patently unjust. The trial court's order regarding 
equitable distribution of the business and allocation of concurrent 
assets and liabilities should be upheld. 
V. 
TUB TRIAL COURT MADE ABSOLUTELY NO FINDINGS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO MS. MEZENEN: FURTHERMORE, AN AWARD OF 
FEES ON APPEAL IS UNWARRANTED. 
The trial court granted Ms. Mezenen an award of attorney's 
fees without making any findings regarding the reasonableness of 
9 
such fees, her need, or Mr. Mezenen's ability to pay, all of which 
are required by Utah law. Ms. Mezenen's attempt to support the fee 
award by reference to Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealing of assets is 
of no help; there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Mezenen 
asserted a claim or defense in "bad faith" as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56, the section asserted by Ms. Mezenen. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law are 
devoid of any reference to Ms. Mezenen's need, Mr. Mezenen's 
ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the requested fees3. All 
of these factors are undisputably required to be considered by the 
trial court under Utah law. Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Ms. Mezenen tries to circumvent this glaring 
absence of support in the record by claiming that she has "limited 
income" and that Mr. Mezenen was awarded a "valuable business." 
Such evidence is not part of the court's Findings, and may not be 
considered in determining the propriety of the award. 
3
 It is telling that Ms. Mezenen makes absolutely no 
reference to the fact that she was allowed to amend her complaint, 
mid-trial, to assert a claim for attorney's fees. Such amendment 
was improper under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and created significant prejudice for Mr. Mezenen, most importantly 
because he was afforded no opportunity to investigate the 
reasonableness of the claimed fees. The trial court's award of 
fees should be reversed on this ground alone. Staker v. Huntington 
Cleveland Irrigation Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). 
10 
Furthermore, Ms. Mezenen's attempt to rely upon Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 is equally unavailing. That section allows an award of 
attorney's fees if an action or defense is without merit and 
brought in bad faith. There is no such showing here. Assuming, 
arguendo, that the trial court properly allowed mid-trial amendment 
of the complaint, there is no showing, nor is there such a finding 
in the court's Findings of Fact, that Mr. Mezenen raised any claim 
or defense in bad faith4. Consequently, the trial court's award of 
fees should be reversed. 
Nor is there any basis for an award of fees on appeal. Ms. 
Mezenen merely asserts conclusorily that she should be awarded fees 
on appeal because of Mr. Mezenen's imputed salary of $72,000.00, 
and because she has "insufficient funds." Again, since the trial 
court made no finding regarding Ms. Mezenen's need5, such 
allegations may not properly be considered. Furthermore, Ms. 
4
 Ms. Mezenen cites Finlayson v. Finlaysonr 874 P. 2d 843 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) in support of her claim for attorney's fees. 
However, Finlaysonr and the authority cited therein, deals with the 
specific situation where one party is forced to bring proceedings 
to compel due to the other party's failure to comply with the 
provisions of a decree or order. Here, no such proceedings have 
ever been brought. Consequently, these cases are inapposite. 
5
 To the contrary, the trial court found that, at the time of 
the divorce, Ms. Mezenen was engaged in a training program which 
would enable her to "provide for her own support and maintenance" 
and that she expected to receive "a fairly significant pay increase 
at her new job and position." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 5 15). 
11 
Mezenen must show that she "prevailed on the main issues" in order 
to receive an award of fees on appeal. Rosendahl v. Rosendahlf 876 
P.2d 870, 875 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Based upon the issues raised 
in the appeal and cross-appeal, there is no basis for such a 
showing. Consequently, the trial court's decision (1) to allow Ms. 
Mezenen to amend her complaint mid-trial and (2) to enter an award 
of fees without any of the requisite findings should be reversed, 
and the parties ordered to bear their own costs and fees on appeal. 
VI. 
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
DEMONSTRATES THAT MS. MEZENEN ENGAGED IN 
COHABITATION; IH1 EVIDENCE; IN THE RECORD 
SPECIFICALLY CONTRADICTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION. 
Not surprisingly, Ms. Mezenen fails to point to any evidence 
in the record sufficient to support the trial court's plainly 
erroneous finding that she did not engage in cohabitation. This 
finding is undeniably against the weight of the evidence and in 
contradiction to well-established Utah law. Ms. Mezenen's attempt 
to support the finding by claiming that the temporary alimony 
payments in fact represented a partial distribution of profits is 
baseless and lends no support whatsoever to the trial court's 
erroneous finding. 
In her Brief, Ms. Mezenen relies upon the fact that the 
cohabitant, Mr. Grumwald, was working out of state while engaging 
12 
in a relationship with Ms. Mezenen. Under prevailing Utah law, 
this fact is, frankly, irrelevant. The record demonstrates the 
following: 
• Mr. Grumwald stayed in Ms. Mezenen's home for overnight 
periods during 1995 when he was working in the state of Utah (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 116) ; 
• the two traveled together outside the State of Utah on 
numerous trips financed by Mr. Mezenen, went on camping trips 
within the state, and engaged in sexual intercourse (Exhibit A, f 
19; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 118-119, 125); 
• while residing with Ms. Mezenen, Mr. Grumwald performed 
various household tasks, including purchasing groceries, assisting 
with cooking and household chores, and helping Ms. Mezenen's 
children with their homework (Exhibit A, f 19, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 123-
124, 126-127); and 
• he used the utilities at will, and had free access to Ms. 
Mezenen's residence, where he stored snowmobiles and other vehicles 
(Exhibit A, fl 19). 
In light of this express, uncontroverted testimony which 
became part of the trial court's Findings, the conclusion that Ms. 
Mezenen did not engage in cohabitation is plainly erroneous and an 
abuse of discretion. The facts presented are virtually identical 
to those in Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 
13 
1996) (a finding of cohabitation was warranted where the alleged 
cohabitant stayed with Ms. Pendleton in her home "ninety percent of 
the time" while he was in town, despite the fact that his job 
required substantial travel out of state, he came and went at will, 
and ate almost all of his meals with Ms. Pendleton while he was in 
town), and mandate the same result; i.e., a finding of cohabitation 
requiring a refund of alimony previously paid under the temporary 
orders. 
Furthermore, Ms. Mezenen's attempt to argue that the alimony 
previously paid was in fact not alimony, but a distribution of 
profits, is both unsupported and unavailing. The trial court 
expressly noted that "the Defendant was ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff as and for alimony on a temporary basis the sum of 
$1,200.00 per month . . . ." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, f 16). Ms. Mezenen attempts to rely upon another portion of 
the Findings; specifically, that there were no undistributed 
profits of the business to be awarded. However, the court was 
merely explaining what had happened to such profits. The fact that 
certain alimony payments were made by the business, which was 
awarded to Mr. Mezenen, has no bearing whatsoever on the 
cohabitation issue. Mr. Mezenen was ordered to pay temporary 
alimony. He did so. Ms. Mezenen engaged in cohabitation during 
14 
that period. As such the trial court's decision regarding 
cohabitation should be reversed. 
VII. 
THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE COURT CORRECTLY 
DECLINED TO ADMIT LACKED FOUNDATION AND 
RELEVANCE. 
Ms. Mezenen asserts that a 1995 Partnership tax return which 
was never filed with the Internal Revenue Service should have been 
admitted into evidence. Not only did the document lack foundation; 
Ms. Mezenen has failed to allege or demonstrate that she was 
prejudiced by the court's refusal to admit the document. Absent 
such impact on the substantial right of a party, the court's 
decision to admit or refuse to admit evidence will not be 
overturned. 
It is undisputed that the tax return was never filed with the 
Internal Revenue Service. Consequently, it is not binding upon Mr. 
Mezenen or the company, and does not represent any accurate measure 
of profits or value. More importantly, Ms. Mezenen has failed to 
show that the non-admission of the tax returns impacted any 
substantial right which she possessed. This showing is a 
fundamental prerequisite. As this Court explained in Hardy v. 
Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), "[w]e will not reverse a 
trial court's determination on the admissibility of evidence absent 
an abuse of discretion impacting a party's substantial rights." 
15 
Id, at 924. See State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) ("in reviewing a trial 
court's decision to admit evidence, we will not reverse that ruling 
unless a substantial right of the party has been affected") . 
Because Ms. Mezenen has failed to make any showing of 
prejudice or substantial impact upon her rights, the trial court's 
decision not to receive into evidence the 1995 tax return should be 
upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Essentially, Ms. Mezenen has attacked key elements of the 
trial court's property distribution while failing to make any 
showing as to why it should be disturbed. Ms. Mezenen claims that 
the trial court erred by not making a distribution of pre-decree 
profits of the parties' business, but fails to demonstrate that 
there was cash available to effectuate the distribution. The trial 
court expressly found that such profits were accounted for in 
salary to Mr. Mezenen and alimony payments to Ms. Mezenen. 
Although Ms. Mezenen claims that the business enjoyed some 
available cash, she fails to address the fact that any such cash 
was included in the valuation of the business. Ms. Mezenen, then, 
enjoyed the benefit of such cash in the court's allocation of the 
value of the business. 
16 
Ms. Mezenen7s attempt to challenge the court's finding of 
imputed salary to Mr. Mezenen is equally flawed. The record is 
replete with support for such imputed salary, particularly in light 
of the fact that Mr. Mezenen was responsible for virtually all 
aspects of the business7 operations, as he was in fact ordered by 
the court to over see. Ms. Mezenen has not only failed to marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the specific finding, as she is 
required to do, she has also failed to demonstrate any reason as to 
why it should be reversed. 
The court's findings regarding premarital assets should also 
be upheld. It is undisputed that the Certificate of Deposit and 
approximately $5,800.00 in funds used to make a down payment on the 
parties' residence were acquired before the marriage by Mr. Mezenen 
and, consequently, were properly awarded to him as his separate and 
premarital property. Ms. Mezenen has asserted no facts whatsoever 
sufficient to reverse that finding. 
As fully set forth in Mr. Mezenen's opening Brief, both the 
trial court's award of attorney's fees to Ms. Mezenen and its 
finding regarding cohabitation should be reversed. The trial court 
plainly erred by allowing Ms. Mezenen to amend her complaint to add 
a claim for fees mid-trial, and by awarding such fees without 
making any of the findings long required by Utah law. Finally, the 
trial court's finding regarding cohabitation was blatantly 
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erroneous. It is difficult to imagine a clearer-cut case of 
cohabitation as these facts demonstrate. In light of Ms. 
Mezenen's own testimony, the trial court's finding regarding 
cohabitation should be reversed. 
In sum, Mr, Mezenen respectfully submits the following: (1) 
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce regarding distribution of 
property should be upheld; and (2) the trial court's findings 
regarding attorney's fees and cohabitation should be reversed. 
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DATED: September 29, 1997. 
CAMPB 
CLARK W. SESSIONS^^' 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross Appellee 
Kelly Mezenen 
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